A popular approach to tweakable blockcipher design is via masking, where a certain primitive (a blockcipher or a permutation) is preceded and followed by an easy-to-compute tweak-dependent mask. In this work, we revisit the principle of masking. We do so alongside the introduction of the tweakable Even-Mansour construction MEM. Its masking function combines the advantages of word-oriented LFSRand powering-up-based methods. We show in particular how recent advancements in computing discrete logarithms over finite fields of characteristic 2 can be exploited in a constructive way to realize highly efficient, constant-time masking functions. If the masking satisfies a set of simple conditions, then MEM is a secure tweakable blockcipher up to the birthday bound. The strengths of MEM are exhibited by the design of fully parallelizable authenticated encryption schemes OPP (nonce-respecting) and MRO (misuse-resistant). If instantiated with a reduced-round BLAKE2b permutation, OPP and MRO achieve speeds up to 0.55 and 1.06 cycles per byte on the Intel Haswell microarchitecture, and are able to significantly outperform their closest competitors.
Masked Even-Mansour (MEM) Tweakable Cipher
As a first contribution, we revisit the state of the art in masking with the introduction of the "Masked Even-Mansour" tweakable blockcipher in Section 3. At a high level, MEM is a Tweakable Even-Mansour construction, where the masking combines ideas from both word-oriented LFSR-and powering-up-based masking. As such, MEM combines "the best of both" masking approaches, leading to significant improvements in simplicity, error-proneness, and efficiency.
In more detail, let P be a b-bit permutation. MEM's encryption function is defined as + p 2 k , where q is the number of construction queries, p the number of primitive queries, and k the key length. The security proof follows Patarin's H-coefficient technique, which has shown its use to Even-Mansour security proofs before in, among others, [23, 22, 3, 27, 25, 66] .
To guarantee that the maskings offer enough randomness, it is of pivotal importance to define a proper domain of the masking. At the least, the functions ϕ Guaranteeing this requires the computation of discrete logarithms. For small cases, such as b = 64 and b = 128, we can inherit the computations from Rogaway for XEX [74] . For instance, for b = 128, it is known that u = 3, (ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) = (2, 3, 7), and (i 0 , i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ {−2 108 , . . . , 2 108 } × {−2 7 , . . . , 2 7 } × {−2 7 , . . . , 2 7 } does the job.
We extend the XEX approach to much larger block sizes by taking advantage of the recent breakthroughs in the computation of discrete logs in small characteristic fields, beginning with [32] , followed by [48] . Computation of individual discrete logarithms for the 1024-bit block used in our MEM instantiation takes about 8 hrs on a single core of a standard desktop computer, after an initial precomputation, applicable to all logarithms, of 33.3 hrs. Larger blocks are also attainable, rendering workarounds such as subgroups [80] or different modes [77] for i 0 ranging between 0 and the maximal message length. For COPA, it has (i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ {0, . . . , 5} × {0, 1} and for OTR it has (i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} × {0}. The security proof of Prøst never formally computes conditions on the indices, and simply inherits the conditions for b = 128. By computing the discrete logarithms in the respective fields-a computationally easy task, demonstrated in Section 3.6-we can confirm that the tweaks are unique for i 0 ∈ {0, . . . , 2 246 − 1} in the 256-bit block case, and i 0 ∈ {0, . . . , 2 505 − 1} in the 512-bit block case.
As the underlying MEM is used by the absorption and encryption parts for different maskings, we can view the absorption and encryption as two independent functions and a classical MAC-then-Encrypt security proof shows that MRO is secure up to complexity dominated by min{2 b/2 , 2 k , 2 τ /2 }, where b and k are as before and τ denotes the tag length. Next, we consider Misuse-Resistant Sponge (MRS) in Section 6. It is not directly based on MEM; it can merely be seen as a cascaded evaluation of the Full-state Keyed Duplex of Mennink et al. [66] , a generalization of the Duplex of Bertoni et al. [10] : a first evaluation computes the tag on input of all data, the second evaluation encrypts the message with the tag functioning as the nonce. MRS is mostly presented to suit the introduction of the Misuse-Resistant Sponge-Offset hybrid (MRSO) in Section 7, which absorbs like MRS and encrypts like MRO. (It is also possible to consider the complementary Offset-Sponge hybrid, but we see no potential applications of this construction.) The schemes MRS and MRSO are proven secure up to complexity of about min{2 c/2 , 2 k/2 , 2 τ /2 } and min{2 (b−τ )/2 , 2 k , 2 τ /2 }, respectively, where c denotes the capacity of the Sponge.
While various blockcipher-based fully misuse-resistant AE schemes exist (such as SIV [76] [73] ), and DAEAD [20] ), the state of the art for permutation-based schemes is rather scarce. In particular, the only misuse-resistant AE schemes known in literature are Haddoc and Mr. Monster Burrito by Bertoni et al. [12] . Haddoc lacks a proper formalization but appears to be similar to MRSO, and the security and efficiency bounds mostly carry over. Mr. Monster Burrito is a proof of concept to design a permutation-based robust AE comparable with AEZ [42] , but it is four-pass and thus not very practical.
When instantiated with a reduced-round BLAKE2b permutation, MRO achieves a peak speed of 1.06 cycles per byte on the Intel Haswell platform (see Section 8) . This puts MRO on the same level as AES-GCM-SIV [39] (1.17 cpb), which, however, requires AES-NI to reach its best performance. We further remark that MRO is also more efficient than MRSO, and thus the Haddoc mode.
Notation
Denote by F 2 n the finite field of order 2 n with n ≥ 1. A b-bit string X is an element of {0, 1} b or equivalently of the F 2 -vector space F b 2 . The length of a bit string X in bits is denoted by |X| (= b) and in r-bit blocks by |X| r . For example, the size of X in bytes is |X| 8 . The bit string of length 0 is identified with ε. The concatenation of two bit strings X and Y is denoted by X Y . The encoding of an integer x as an n-bit string is denoted by x n . The symbols ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊕, , , ≪, and ≫, denote bit-wise NOT, OR, AND, XOR, left-shift, right-shift, left-rotation, and right-rotation, respectively.
Given a b-bit string X = x 0 · · · x b−1 we define left l (X) = x 0 · · · x l−1 to be the l left-most and right r (X) = x b−r · · · x b−1 to be the r right-most bits of X, respectively, where 1 ≤ l, r ≤ b. In particular, note that X = left l (X) right b−l (X) = left b−r (X) right r (X). We define the following mapping functions which extend a given input string X to a multiple of the block size b and cut it into chunks of b bits: The set of all permutations of width b ≥ 0 bits is denoted by Perm(b). The parameters k, n, τ ≥ 0 conventionally define the size of the key, nonce, and tag, respectively, for which we require that n ≤ b − k − 1. In the context of Sponge functions r ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0 denote rate and capacity such that b = r + c, and we require k ≤ c. When writing X $ ← − X for some finite set X , we mean that X gets sampled uniformly at random from X .
Distinguishers
A distinguisher D is a computationally unbounded probabilistic algorithm. By D O we denote the setting that D is given query access to an oracle O: it can make queries to O adaptively, and after this, the distinguisher outputs 0 or 1. If we consider two different oracles O and P with the same interface, we define the distinguishing advantage of D by
Here, the probabilities are taken over the randomness from O and P. The distinguisher is usually bounded by a limited set of resources, e.g., it is allowed to make at mostueries to its oracle. We will use the definition of ∆ for our formalization of the security (tweakable) blockciphers and authenticated encryption. Later in the paper, ∆ is used to measure the security of PRFs, etc.
Tweakable Blockciphers
Let T be a set of "tweaks." A tweakable blockcipher E : {0,
is a function such that for every key K ∈ {0, 1} k and tweak T ∈ T , E(K, T, ·) is a permutation in Perm(b). We denote its inverse by E −1 (K, T, ·). Denote by Perm(T , b) the set of families of tweakable permutations π such that π(T, ·) ∈ Perm(b) for every T ∈ T .
but satisfies the undesirable property of backwards decryption. Also Minalpher and Prøst-COPA are online misuse-resistant.
The conventional security definitions for tweakable blockciphers are tweakable pseudorandom permutation (TPRP) security and strong TPRP (STPRP) security: in the former, the distinguisher can only make forward construction queries, while in the latter it is additionally allowed to make inverse construction queries. We will consider a mixed security notion, where the distinguisher may only make forward queries for a subset of tweaks. It is inspired by earlier definitions from Rogaway [74] and Andreeva et al. [2] .
Let P $ ← − Perm(b) be a b-bit permutation, and consider a tweakable blockcipher E based on permutation P . Consider a partition T 0 ∪ T 1 = T of the tweak space into forward-only tweaks T 0 and forward-and-inverse tweaks T 1 . We define the mixed tweakable pseudorandom permutation (MTPRP) security of E against a distinguisher D as
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of K, π, and P . The distinguisher is not allowed to query E 
It is a straightforward observation that if a tweakable cipher E is MTPRP for two sets (T 0 , T 1 ), then it is MTPRP for (T 0 ∪ {T }, T 1 \{T }) for any T ∈ T 1 . Ultimately, this observation implies that an STPRP is a TPRP.
Authenticated Encryption
Let Π = (E, D) be a deterministic authenticated encryption (AE) scheme which is keyed via a secret key K ∈ {0, 1} k and operates as follows:
Here, N is the nonce, H the associated data, M the message, C the ciphertext, and T the tag. In our analysis, we always have |M | = |C|, and we require that
for every input. Finally, we denote by ⊥ a function that returns ⊥ upon every query.
Our AE schemes are based on a b-bit permutation P , and we will analyze the security of them in the setting where P is a random permutation: P $ ← − Perm(b). Following, Rogaway and Shrimpton [76] , Namprempre et al. [68] , and Gueron and Lindell [39], we define the AE security of Π against a distinguisher D as
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of K, $ E , and P . The distinguisher is not allowed (i) to repeat any query and (ii) to relay the output of E K to the input of D K . Note that we do not a priori require the distinguisher to be nonce-respecting: depending on the setting, it may repeat nonces at its own discretion. We will always mention whether we consider nonce-respecting or nonce-reusing distinguishers. By
we denote the maximum advantage over all (nonce-respecting/reusing) distinguishers that make at most q E queries to the encryption oracle and at most q D to the decryption oracle, of total length at most σ padded blocks, and that make at most p queries to P ± .
Tweakable Even-Mansour with General Masking
We present the tweakable Even-Mansour construction MEM. Earlier appearances of tweakable Even-Mansour constructions include Sasaki et al. [78] , Cogliati et al. [25] , and Mennink [65] , but these constructions target different settings, do not easily capture the improved maskings as introduced below, and are therefore not applicable in this work.
Our specification can be seen as a generalization of both the XE(X) construction of Rogaway [74] and the tweakable blockcipher from Chakraborty and Sarkar [19] to the permutation-based setting. While Rogaway limited himself to 128-bit fields, we realize our approach to fields well beyond the reach of Pohlig-Hellman: historically the large block size would have been a severe obstruction, as observed in works by Yasuda and Sarkar [80, 77] , and some schemes simply ignored the issue [53] . The breakthroughs in computing discrete logarithms in small characteristic fields [32, 48, 7, 36] allow to easily pass the 128-bit barrier. In particular, for blocks of 2 n bits, it is eminently practical to compute discrete logarithms for n ≤ 13. Further details of our solution of discrete logarithms over F 2 512 and F 2 1024 are described in Section 3.6.
Definition
Let b ≥ 0 and P ∈ Perm(b). In the following we specify MEM, a tweakable Even-Mansour block cipher with general masking ( E, D) where E and D denote encryption and decryption functions, respectively. Let u ≥ 1, and let Φ = {ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ u−1 } be a set of functions ϕ j : {0,
. Consider a tweak space T of the form
and specify the general masking function δ :
By convention, we set ϕ ij j = id for i j = 0, for each 0 ≤ j ≤ u − 1. For brevity of notation we writē i = (i 0 , . . . , i u−1 ), and set Tī = ī | ∃X such that (X,ī) ∈ T .
The encryption function
where M denotes the to be encrypted message. The decryption function D :
is defined analogously as
where C denotes the to be decrypted ciphertext. Note that the usual block cipher property
M is obviously satisfied. Throughout the document, we will often use the following shorthand notation for
Security
Eq. (4) already reveals that we require some kind of restriction on T . Informally, we require the masking functions ϕ
0 to generate pairwise independent values for different tweaks. More formally, we define proper tweak spaces in Definition 1. This definition is related to earlier observations in Rogaway [74] and Chakraborty and Sarkar [19, 77] . 
For any y
The definition is reminiscent of the definition of universal hash functions (as also noted in [19] ), but we will stick to the convention. We are now ready to prove the security of MEM.
The proof is given in Appendix A. It is based on Patarin's H-coefficient technique [71, 23] , and borrows ideas from [74, 19, 77, 65 ].
History of Masking
Originally, IAPM [52] proposed the masking to be a subset sum of c encrypted blocks derived from the nonce, where 2 c is the maximum number of blocks a message can have. In the same document Jutla also suggested masking the jth block with (j + 1)K + IV mod p, for some prime p near the block size. XCBC [29] used a similar masking function, but replaced arithmetic modulo p by arithmetic modulo 2 b , at the cost of some tightness in security reductions.
OCB [75, 74, 58] and PMAC [13] used the field F 2 b for their masking. There are two different masking functions used in variants of OCB:
-The powering-up method of OCB2 [74] 
where · is multiplication in F 2 b , and x is a generator of the field.
-The Gray code masking of OCB1 [75] and
, provided a precomputation of log 2 |M | multiples of L is carried out in advance. Otherwise, up to log 2 i field doublings are required to obtain γ i · L. This Gray code trick was also applicable to IAPM's subset-sum masking.
Another family of masking functions, word-oriented LFSRs, was suggested by Chakraborty and Sarkar [19] . Instead of working directly with the polynomial representation F 2 [x]/f for some primitive polynomial f , word-oriented LFSRs treat the block as the field F 2 wn , where w is the native word size. Thus, the block can be represented as a polynomial of degree n over F 2 w , which makes the arithmetic more software-friendly. A further generalized variant of this family of generators is described (and rejected) in [58, Appendix B], who also attribute the same technique to [81] . Instead of working with explicitly-constructed field representations, one starts by trying to find a b × b matrix M ∈ GL(b, F 2 ) that is very efficient to compute. Then, if this matrix has a primitive minimal polynomial of degree b, this transformation is in fact isomorphic to F 2 b and has desirable masking properties. The masking function is then ϕ More recently, Minematsu [67] suggested a different approach to masking based on data-dependent rotation. In particular,
where the block size b is prime. With Gray code ordering, one only needs one rotation and XOR per sequential mask without storing previous masks. That being said, the prime block size is inconvenient, and data-dependent rotation is a relatively expensive operation compared to some of the previous techniques.
Proposed Masking for u = 1
We loosely follow the Xorshift [62] design approach for our masking procedure. Let b = nw be the block size, interpreted as n words of w bits. We begin with fast linear operations available in most current CPUs and encode them as w × w matrices. More precisely, we denote by 0 the all-zero matrix, by I the identity matrix, by SHL c and SHR c matrices corresponding to left-and right-shift by c bits, by ROT c the matrix realizing left-rotation by c bits, and by AND c the matrix corresponding to bit-wise AND with a constant c. Then, we construct block matrices using those operations in a way that minimizes computational effort. To maximize efficiency we consider b × b matrices over F 2 of the form
with Testing candidate masks for maximal order may be efficiently performed without any explicit matrix operations. Given a candidate linear map corresponding to a matrix M of the form Eq. (5),
one can simply select x 0 , . . . , x n−1 at random, define x i+n = f (x i , . . . , x i+n−1 ), and obtain the connection polynomial p(x) from the sequence of least significant bits of x 0 , . . . , x 2b using, e.g., Berlekamp-Massey. If p(x) is a primitive polynomial of degree b, p(x) is also the minimal polynomial of the associated matrix M .
This approach yields a number of simple and efficient masking functions. In particular, the 3-operation primitives (x 0 ≪ r 0 ) ⊕ (x i r 1 ) and (x 0 ≪ r 0 ) ⊕ (x i r 1 ) are found for several useful block and word sizes, as Table 1 illustrates. Some block sizes do not yield such small generators so easily; in particular, 128-bit blocks require at least 4 operations, which is consistent-albeit somewhat better-with the results of [58, Appendix B] . Using an extra basic instruction, double-word shift, another noteworthy class of maskings appears:
. This leads to more block sizes with 3-operation masks, e.g., (
11)) for 128-bit blocks (cf. Table 1 ). Lemma 3 shows that this approach yields proper masking functions according to Definition 1. Proof. [19, Proposition 1] directly applies. One may wonder whether there is any significant advantage of the above technique over, say, the Gray code sequence with the standard polynomial representation. We argue that our approach improves on it in several ways: Simplicity OCB (especially OCB2) requires implementers to be aware of Galois field arithmetic. Our approach requires no user knowledge-even implicitly-of field or polynomial arithmetic, but only unconditional shifts and XOR operations. Even Sarkar's word-based LFSRs [77] do not hide the finite field structure from implementers, thus making it easier to make mistakes.
Constant-time
Both OCB masking schemes require potentially variable-time operations to compute each mask-be it conditional XOR, number of trailing zeroes, or memory accesses indexed by ntz(i + 1). This is easily avoidable by clever implementers, but it is also a pitfall avoidable by our design choice. Even in specifications aimed at developers [56] , double(S) is defined as a variable-time operation.
Efficiency Word-based masking has the best space-time efficiency tradeoff of all considered masking schemes. It requires only minimal space usage-one block-while also involving a very small number of operations beyond the XOR with the block (as low as 3, cf. Table 1 ). It is also SIMD-friendly, allowing the generation of several consecutive masks with a single short SIMD instruction sequence.
In particular, for permutations that can take advantage of a CPU's vector units via "word-slicing"-which is the case for Salsa20, ChaCha, Threefish, and many other ARX designs-it is possible to compute a few consecutive masks at virtually the same cost as computing a single mask transition. It is also efficient to add the mask to the plaintext both in transposed order (word-sliced) and regular order.
For concreteness, consider the mask sequence (
) and a permutation using 512-bit blocks of 32-bit words. Suppose further that we are working with a CPU with 8-wide vectors, e.g., AVX2. Given 8 additional words of storage, it is possible to compute 
. . . This would be impossible with the standard masking schemes used in, e.g., OCB.
There is also an advantage at the low-end-ϕ can easily be implemented as a circular array, which implies that only an index increment and the logical operations must be executed for each mask update. This improves on both the typical Gray code and powering-up approach, in that shifting by one requires moving every word of the mask, instead of only one of them. Additionally, storage is often a precious resource in low-end systems, and the Gray code method requires significantly more than one block to achieve its best performance.
Proposed Masking for u = 2 and u = 3
Modes often require the tweak space to have multiple dimensions. In particular, the modes of Sections 4 and 5 require the tweak space to have 2 and 3 "coordinates." To extend the masking function from Section 3.4 to a tweak space divided into disjunct sets, we have several options. We can simply split the range [0, 2 b − 1] into equivalence classes, e.g., i 0 = 4k + 0, i 1 = 4k + 1, . . . for at most 4 different tweak indexes. Some constructions instead store a few fixed tweak values that are used later as "extra" finalization tweaks.
The approach we follow takes a cue from XEX [74] . Before introducing the scheme itself, we need a deeper understanding of the masking function ϕ introduced in Section 3.4. At its core, ϕ is a linear map representable by a matrix M with primitive minimal polynomial p(x). In fact, ϕ can be interpreted as the matrix representation [61, §2.52] of F 2 b , where M is, up to a change of basis, the companion matrix of p(x). This property may be exploited to quickly jump ahead to an arbitrary state ϕ
. Therefore we can implement arbitrarily large "jumps" in the tweak space by evaluating the right polynomials over M . This property-like fast word-oriented shift registers-has had its first uses in the pseudorandom number generation literature [41] .
Since we may control the polynomials here, we choose the very same polynomials as Rogaway for the best performance: x + 1, and x 2 + x + 1, denoted in [74] as 3 and 7. Putting everything together, our masking for
To ensure that the tweak space is b-proper we need one extra detail: we need to ensure that the logarithms log x (x + 1) and log x (x 2 + x + 1) are sufficiently apart. While for F 2 128 Rogaway already computed the corresponding discrete logarithms [74] using generic methods, larger blocks make it nontrivial to show b-properness. The following lemma shows that one particular function satisfies Definition 1. The lemma uses the discrete logarithms whose computation is described in Section 3.6.
Lemma 4. Let ϕ(x) : {0, 1}
1024 → {0, 1} 1024 be the linear map
2 } be the set of functions used in the masking, with ϕ i0
The tweak space
is b-proper relative to the function set Φ.
Proof. The proof closely follows [74, Proposition 5] . Let i 0 ∈ T 0 , i 1 ∈ T 1 , and i 2 ∈ T 2 . We first show that ϕ The values l 1 and l 2 let us represent
. By a simple exhaustive search through the valid ranges of i 1 and i 2 we are able to see that the smallest absolute difference (i 1 − i 1 )l 1 + (i 2 − i 2 )l 2 occurs when i 1 − i 1 = −1 and i 2 − i 2 = −1, and is ≈ 2
1020.58
. Since i 0 − i 0 is at most ±(2 1020 − 1), collisions cannot happen. Since each mask is unique, the fact that T is b-proper follows from Lemma 3.
Remark. Nontrivial bounds for T , such as in the case where one desires T 0 , T 1 , and T 2 to be balanced, cannot be easily found by exhaustive search. Such bounds can be found, however, with lattice reduction. Consider the lattice spanned by the rows 
for a suitable integer K, m = 2 b − 1, and weights w i . A shortest vector for low-dimensional lattices such as this can be computed exactly in polynomial time [69] . A shortest vector for this lattice has the form (∆i 0 + ∆i 1 l 1 + ∆i 2 l 2 + km, ∆i 0 w 0 , ∆i 1 w 1 , ∆i 2 w 2 ), and will be shortest when ∆i 0 + ∆i 1 l 1 + ∆i 2 l 2 ≡ 0 (mod 2 n − 1). This yields concrete bounds on i 0 , i 1 , and i 2 . The constant K needs to be large enough to avoid trivial shortest vectors such as (K, 1, 0, 0). The weights w i can be used to manipulate the relative size of each domain; for example, using the weights 1, 2
1019
, and 2 1022 results in a similar bound as Lemma 4, with T 0 dominating the tweak space.
Computing Discrete Logarithms in F 2 512 and F 2 1024
While the classical incarnation of the Function Field Sieve (FFS) with F 2 as the base field could no doubt solve logarithms in F 2 512 with relatively modest computational resources-see for example [49, 79] -the larger field would require a significant amount of work [6] . One could instead use subfields other than F 2 and apply the medium-base-field method of Joux and Lercier [50], which would be relatively quick for F 2 512 , but not so easy for F 2 1024 .
However, with the advent of the more sophisticated modern incarnation of the FFS, development of which began in early 2013 [32, 48, 33, 7, 34, 35, 51, 36] , the target fields are now regarded as small, even tiny, at least relative to the largest such example computation where a DLP in F 2 9234 was solved [37] . Since these developments have effectively rendered small characteristic DLPs useless for public key cryptography, (despite perhaps some potential doubters [ 
18, Appendix D]) it is edifying that there is a constructive application in cryptography 7
for what is generally regarded as a purely cryptanalytic pursuit. Due to the many subfields present in the fields in question, there is a large parameter space to explore with regard to the application of the modern techniques, and it becomes an interesting optimization exercise to find the most efficient approach. Moreover, such is the size of these fields that coding time rather than computing time is the dominant term in the overall cost. We therefore solved the relevant DLPs using MAGMA V2.19-1 [15] , which allowed us to develop rapidly. All computations were executed on a standard desktop computer with a 2.0 GHz AMD Opteron processor.
Fields Setup.
For reasons of both efficiency and convenience we use F 2 16 as base field for both target fields, given by the following extensions:
, where I 32 is the degree 32 irreducible factor of H 32 (X) =
. The other irreducible factors of H 32 (X) have degrees 6 and 11.
We represent F 2 1024 as F 2 16 [X]/(I 64 (X)) = F 2 16 (x), where I 64 is the degree 64 irreducible factor of
. The other irreducible factors of H 64 (X) have degrees 7 and 10. Transforming from the original representations of Section 3.6.3 to these is a simple matter [60] .
Note that ideally one would only have to use h i 's of degree 2 and 4 to obtain degree 32 and 64 irreducibles, respectively. However, no such h i 's exist and so we are forced to use h i 's of degree 3 and 5. The penalty for doing so incurs during the relation generation, see Section 3.6.2, and during the descent, in particular for degree 2 elimination, see Section 3.6.3.
Remark. The degrees of the irreducible cofactors of I 32 in H 32 and of I 64 in H 64 is an essential consideration in the set up of the two fields. In particular, if the degree d f of a cofactor f has a non-trivial GCD with the degree of the main irreducible, then it should be considered as a 'trap' for the computation of the logarithms of the factor base elements, modulo all primes dividing 2 16·gcd(d f ,32i) − 1 for i = 1, 2, for F 2 512 and F 2 1024 , respectively [45, 24] . This is because F 2 16 [X]/(H 32i (X)) will contain another copy of F 2 16·gcd(d f ,32i) which arises from f , and hence the solution space modulo primes dividing 2 16·gcd(d f ,32i) − 1 has rank > 1. Our choice of h 0 and h 1 in each case limits the effect of this problem to prime factors of 2 32 − 1, namely subgroups of tiny order within which we solve the DLPs using a linear search. The irreducible cofactors are also traps for the descent phase [34] , but are easily avoided.
Relation Generation and Logarithms of Linear Elements.
The factor base is defined to be
To generate relations over F, we use the technique from [32] , described most simply in [34] . In particular, for both target fields let y = x
16
; by the definitions of I 32 and I 64 it follows in both cases that x = h 0 (y)/h 1 (y). Using these field isomorphisms, for any a, b, c ∈ F 2 16 we have the field equality
One can easily generate (a, b, c) triples such that the left hand side of Eq. (6) always splits completely over F. , and each h 1 is a power of a factor base element. The probability that the right hand side of Eq. (6) splits completely is heuristically 1/4! and 1/6! for F 2 512 and F 2 1024 respectively. In both cases we obtain 2 16 + 200 relations, which took about 0.3 hrs and 8.8 hrs, respectively. To compute the logarithms of the factor base elements, we used MAGMA's ModularSolution function, with its Lanczos option set, modulo the 9th to 13th largest prime factors of 2 512 − 1 for the smaller field and modulo the 10th to 16th largest prime factors of 2 1024 − 1 for the larger field. These took about 13.5 hrs and 24.5 hrs, respectively.
Individual Logarithms.
The original representations of the target fields are:
In order to solve the two relevant DLPs in each original field, we need to compute three logarithms in each of our preferred field representations, namely the logarithms of the images of t, t + 1 and t 2 + t + 1-which we denote by t 0 , t 1 and t 2 -relative to some generator. We use the generator x in both cases.
For F 2 512 , we multiply the targets t i by random powers of x and apply a continued fraction initial split so that x k t i ≡ n/d (mod I 32 ), with n of degree 16 and d of degree 15, until both n and d are 4-smooth. One then just needs to eliminate irreducible elements of degree 2, 3, 4 into elements of smaller degree. For degree 4 elements, we apply the building block for the quasi-polynomial algorithm due to Granger, Kleinjung, and Zumbrägel [35, 36] , which is just degree 2 elimination but over a degree 2 extended base field. This results in each degree 4 element being expressed as a product of powers of at most 19 degree 2 elements, and possibly some linear elements. For degree 3 elimination we use Joux's bilinear quadratic system approach [48] , which expresses each degree 3 element as a product of powers of again at most 19 degree 2 elements and at least one linear element. For degree 2 elimination, we use the on-the-fly technique from [32] , but with the quadratic system approach from [33] , which works for an expected proportion 1 − (1 − 1/2!)
16
= 255/256 of degree 2's, since the cofactor in each case has degree 2. On average each descent takes about 10 s, and if it fails due to a degree 2 being ineliminable, we simply rerun it with a different random seed. Computing logarithms modulo the remaining primes only takes a few seconds with a linear search, which completes the following results: log t (t + 1) = 5016323028665706705636609709550289619036901979668873 4872643788516514405882411611155920582686309266723854 51223577928705426532802261055149398490181820929802 ,
The total computation time for these logarithms is less than 14 hrs. A MAGMA verification script for these discrete logarithms is given in Appendix F.
For F 2 1024 , we use the same continued fraction initial split, but now with n and d of degree 32 and 31, until each is 4-smooth, but also allowing a number of degree 8 elements. Finding such an expression takes on average 7 hrs, which, while not optimal, means that the classical special-Q elimination method could be obviated, i.e., not coded. For degree 8 elimination, we again use the building block for the quasi-polynomial algorithm of Granger et al., which expresses such a degree 8 element as a product of powers of at most 21 degree 4 elements, and possibly some degree 2 and 1 elements. Degree 4 and 3 elimination proceed as before, but with a larger cofactor of the element to be eliminated on the r.h.s. due to the larger degrees of h 0 and h 1 . Degree 2 elimination is significantly harder in this case, since the larger degrees of the h i 's mean that the elimination probability for a random degree 2 element was only 1 − (1 − 1/4!) 16 ≈ 0.494. However, using the recursive method from the DLP computation in F 2 4404 [34] allows this to be performed with near certainty. If any of the eliminations fails, then as before we simply rerun the eliminations with a different random seed. In total, after the initial rewrite of the target elements into a product of degree 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 elements, each descent takes just under an hour. Again, computing logarithms modulo the remaining primes takes less than a minute with a linear search resulting in: The total computation time for these logarithms is about 57 hrs. A MAGMA verification script for these discrete logarithms is given in Appendix F.
Note that it is possible to avoid the computations in F 2 512 altogether by embedding the relevant DLPs into F 2 1024 . However, the descent time would take longer than the total time, at least with the non-optimal descent that we used. We considered the possibility of using "jokers" [34] , which permit one to halve the degree of even degree irreducibles when they are elements of a subfield of index 2. However, it seems to only be possible when one uses compositums, which is not possible in the context of the fields F 2 2 n . In any case, such optimizations are academic when the total computation time is as modest as those recorded here, and our approach has the bonus of demonstrating the easiness of computing logarithms in F 2 512 , as well as in
With regard to larger n, it would certainly be possible to extend the approach of Kleinjung [55] to solve logarithms in the fields F 2 2 n for n = 11, 12 and 13, should this be needed for applications, without too much additional effort.
Offset Public Permutation Mode (OPP)
We present the Offset Public Permutation Mode (OPP), a nonce-respecting authenticated encryption mode with support for associated data which uses the techniques presented in Section 3. It can be seen as a generalization of OCB3 [58] to arbitrary block sizes using permutations and using improved masking techniques from Section 3.
Specification of OPP
Let b, k, n, τ as outlined in Section 2. OPP uses MEM of Section 3.1 for u = 3 and Φ = {α, β, γ} with
employing ϕ as introduced in Section 3.4. Furthermore, the general masking function is specified as
We require that the tweak space of MEM used in OPP is b-proper with respect to Φ as introduced in Definition 1 and proven in Lemma 4. The formal specification of OPP is given in Fig. 1 and overview of the scheme is depicted in Fig. 2 . We refer to the authentication part of OPP as OPPAbs and to the encryption part as OPPEnc. The OPPAbs mode requires only the encryption function E, while the OPPEnc mode uses both E and D of MEM.
Let OPPAbs OPPEnc 
S ← S ⊕ Mi 8. end 9. if |Mm−1| > 0 then 10 .
S ← S ⊕ Mi 8. end 9. if |Cm−1| > 0 then 10 . The proof is given in Appendix B. Note that OPP shares its structure with OCB3 of Krovetz and Rogaway [58] . In more detail, we will show that once MEM gets replaced by a random tweakable permutation π, OPP becomes exactly the ΘCB3 construction [58] . The proof follows by combining the security of MEM and the security of ΘCB3. The first three terms of Theorem 5 come from the security of MEM and the b-properness of the masking.
Misuse-Resistant Offset Mode (MRO)
We present the Misuse-Resistant Offset Mode (MRO), a MAC-then-Encrypt AE mode with support for associated data which fully tolerates nonce re-usage. In some sense, MRO is the misuse-resistant variant of OPP and also uses the techniques presented in Section 3. It can be seen as a permutation-based variation of PMAC [13] followed by a permutation-based variation of CTR mode, and shares ideas with the Synthetic Counter in Tweak (SCT) mode [73] used in Deoxys v1.3 and Joltik v1. 3 [46,47] , though MRO is permutationbased and employs the improved masking schedule of Section 3.
Specification of MRO
Let b, k, n, τ as outlined in Section 2. The formal specification of MRO is given in Fig. 3 and an overview of the scheme is depicted in Fig. 4 . Similar to OPP, we refer to the authentication part of MRO as MROAbs
. . . and to the encryption part as MROEnc. In contrast to OPP, MRO only requires the encryption function E of MEM. Using notation as in the OPP mode, MRO uses the following setup for masking:
Security of MRO

Theorem 6. Let b, k, n, τ as outlined in Section 2. Let
Then, in the nonce-reuse setting, The proof is given in Appendix C. The proof is in fact a standard-model proof where the scheme is considered to be based on MEM. It is a modular proof that, at a high level, consists of the following steps:
(i) The first step in the analysis is to replace MEM with a random secret tweakable permutation. It costs the MTPRP security of MEM,
The absorption function and encryption function call the tweakable cipher for distinct tweaks. Hence, using an adaption of the MAC-then-Encrypt paradigm to misuse resistance [68, 39] allows us to analyze the MAC parts and the encryption parts separately.
Misuse-Resistant Sponge (MRS)
We introduce the Misuse-Resistant Sponge Mode (MRS), a MAC-then-Encrypt Sponge-based AE mode with support for associated data which fully tolerates nonce re-usage. The absorption function is a full-state keyed Sponge MAC [11, 3, 66] . The encryption function follows the SpongeWrap approach [10, 66] .
Specification of MRS
Let b, k, n, τ, r, c as outlined in Section 2. The formal specification of MRS is given in Fig. 5 and an overview of the scheme is depicted in Fig. 6 . It consists of an absorption function MRSAbs and an encryption function MRSEnc, in a MAC-then-Encrypt mode, but using the same primitive and same key in both functions. We
MROAbs, header absorb
MROAbs, message absorb MROAbs, tag generation MROEnc, message encryption remark that MRS as given in Fig. 5 only does one round of squeezing in order to obtain the tag. This can be easily generalized to multiple rounds, without affecting the security proofs. We briefly discuss the differences of MRS with Haddoc, the misuse-resistant AE scheme presented by Bertoni et al. [12] at the 2014 SHA-3 workshop. Haddoc follows the MAC-then-Encrypt paradigm as well, where the MAC function is identical to MRSAbs. For encryption, however, Haddoc uses the Sponge in CTR mode. At a high level, and in our terminology, this boils down to C i = M i ⊕ left r (P (T i 1 K)), for 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. In other words, MRS and Haddoc structurally differ in the way encryption is performed, and in fact, Haddoc more closely matches the ideas of the MRSO hybrid of Section 7.
Security of MRS
Theorem 7. Let b, k, n, τ, r, c as outlined in Section 2. Let
The proof is given in Appendix D. It is different from the proofs for OPP and MRO, although it is also effectively a standard-model proof. It relies on the observation that both the absorption and the encryption phase are in fact evaluations of the Full-state Keyed Duplex [10, 66] . This construction has been proven to behave like a random functionality, with the property that it always outputs uniformly random data, up to common prefix in the input. Assuming that the distinguisher never makes duplicate queries, MRSAbs never has common prefixes; assuming tags never collide, MRSEnc never has common prefixes; and finally, the initial inputs to MRSAbs versus MRSEnc are always different due to the 0/1 domain separation. The proof then easily follows.
Misuse-Resistant Sponge-Offset (MRSO)
The constructions of Sections 5 and 6 can be combined in a straightforward way to obtain two hybrids: the
Misuse-Resistant Sponge-then-Offset Mode (MRSO) and the Misuse-Resistant Offset-then-Sponge Mode
Algorithm: Absorb(S, A)
for i ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} do 6 .
for i ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} do 6 . (MROS). While we cannot think of any practical use-case for MROS, we do think MRSO is useful. As suggested in Section 6, MRSO is comparable with-and in fact improves over-Haddoc.
Specification of MRSO
Let b, k, n, τ as outlined in Section 2. The formal specification of the MRSO AE scheme is formalized in Fig. 7 . It MACs the data using MRSAbs and encrypts using MROEnc. MRSO uses MEM as specified for OPP but requires only a very limited selection of tweaks and has i 1 = i 2 = 0 fixed. Thus, the general masking function can be simplified to
For the encryption part MROEnc this is clear (cf. Section 5). For the absorption part MRSAbs, this is less clear: informally, it is based on the idea of setting L = P (N 0 * K), and of XORing this value everywhere in-between two consecutive evaluations of P . Because at the end of MRSAbs, a part of the rate is extracted, this "trick" only works if performed with the rightmost b − τ bits of L. Therefore, MRSO is based on a slight adjustment of MEM with b − τ -bit maskings only. The details follow in the security proof (Appendix E). Let h = |H| b and m = |M | b denote the number of b-bit header and message blocks, respectively. We use the following setup for masking: Hi
Security of MRSO
Theorem 8. Let b, k, n, τ as outlined in Section 2. Let
Then, in the nonce-reuse setting,
The proof is similar to the proof of MRO, with the difference that now we use (b − τ )-properness of the masking. It is given in Appendix E.
Implementation
In this section we discuss our results on the implementations of concrete instantiations of OPP, MRO, and MRS. For all three schemes we use state, key, tag, and nonce sizes of b = 1024, k = τ = 256, and n = 128 , s 5 , s 10 , s 15 ); G(s 1 , s 6 , s 11 , s 12 ); G(s 2 , s 7 , s 8 , s 13 ); G(s 3 , s 4 , s 9 , s 14 ) ;
where
; BLAKE2 and its predecessors have been heavily analyzed, e.g., [54, 40] . These results are mostly of theoretical interest though since the complexity of the attacks vastly outweigh our targeted security level. Nevertheless, the BLAKE2 permutation family has some evident and well-known non-random characteristics [4] : for any l > 0, it holds that F l (0) = 0 and F l (a, a, a, a, b, b, b, b, c, c, c, c, d, d, d, d) = (w, w, w, w, x, x, x, x, y, y, y, y, z, z, z, z) for arbitrary values a, b, c, and d. These symmetric states can be easily avoided with a careful design, so that they cannot be exploited as a distinguisher. Thus, we use slightly modified variants of the schemes from Sections 4 to 7. Instead of initializing the masks with P (N 0 We wrote reference implementations of all schemes in plain C and optimized variants using the AVX, AVX2, and NEON instruction sets 8 . Performance was measured on the Intel Sandy Bridge and Haswell microarchitectures and on the ARM Cortex-A8 and furthermore compared to some reference AEAD schemes, see Tables 2 and 3 . All values are given for "long messages" (≥ 4 KiB) with cycles per byte (cpb) as unit.
In the nonce-respecting scenario our fastest proposal is OPP with 4 BLAKE2b rounds. Our 4-fold wordsliced AVX2-implementation achieves 0.55 cpb on Haswell, amounting to a throughput of 6.36 GiBps and assuming a CPU frequency of 3.5 GHz. Compared to its competitors AES-GCM, OCB3, ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Deoxys
, this instantiation of OPP is faster by factors of about 1.87, 1.25, 3.80, and 1.74, respectively. The 6-round variant of OPP achieves speeds of about 0.75 cpb (4.67 GiBps) reducing the distance to the above competitors to factors of 1.37, 0.92, 2.78, and 1.28. On ARM platforms, without AES-NI, OPP's advantage is even more significant. The NEON-variant outperforms the AES-based ciphers OCB3 and AES-GCM by factors of about 6.78 and 9.06. In contrast, the highly optimized Salsa20-Poly1305 implementation of [9] is only slower by a factor of around 1.92.
In the misuse-resistant scenario our fastest proposal is MRO with 4 BLAKE2b rounds. Our 4-fold wordsliced AVX2-implementation achieves 1.06 cpb on Haswell which is equivalent to a throughput of 3.30 GiBps at a frequency of 3.5 GHz. In comparison to schemes such as AES-GCM-SIV and Deoxys = (v.1.3), the above instantiation of MRO is faster by factors of about 1.10 and 1.81. For the 6-round version with 1.39 cpb these factors are reduced to 0.79 and 1.38, respectively. Unfortunately, there is not enough published data on performance of misuse-resistant AE schemes on ARM. Analogously to OPP in the nonce-respecting scenario, one can expect similar performance gaps between the misuse-resistant AES-based schemes and MRO. Due to the inherently sequential Sponge-construction used in MRS, advanced implementation techniques like 4-fold word-slicing are not possible. In general, MRS performs therefore worse than MRO. On Haswell MRS achieves 2.40 cpb (l = 4) and 3.58 cpb (l = 6) which translate to throughputs of 1.45 GiBps and 0.97 GiBps, respectively. Thus, MRS is still competitive to other misuse-resistant AE schemes on Intel platforms. On ARM it shows good performance as well, almost on the level of MRO. We have not written any implementations for MRSO but it is to be expected that its performance lies between MRO and MRS. . Consider a deterministic MTPRP distinguisher D for the tweakable blockcipher E of Section 3.1. By the security definition of Section 2.2, in the real world it has access to O = ( E ± , P ± ), and in the ideal world to P = ( π ± , P ± ). It makes q construction queries, and p primitive queries to P ± . By hypothesis, the tweak space T is -proper relative to the set of functions Φ. The distinguisher is expected to obey the masking partition T = T 0 ∪ T 1 in such a way that tweaks from T 0 are only used in forward direction. We have (0, . . . , 0) ∈ T 1ī by assumption, meaning that this masking can be used in forward direction only.
Views. The information that is gathered by D is summarized in a view ν. This view will consist of a summary of all information D learns during the interaction with its oracles, as well as some additional information that will be revealed after the proof.
The construction queries are summarized in a directionless view
meaning that the jth construction query was made on input of tweak (X j ,ī j ) and message M j , and responded with cipher C j , or vice versa. Note that we do not make a distinction between queries with tweak from T 0 and T 1 ; the analysis is identical, with the only exception beingī j = (0, . . . , 0), in which case we have to keep in mind that the query is made in forward direction. Let s denote the number of distinct values X j , and let
. . , Y s } be the minimal set such that it includes X 1 , . . . , X q . The primitive queries are summarized in a view
which means that the jth primitive query was either a forward query on input of x j (with response y j ) or vice versa. As the distinguisher is deterministic, there is a one-to-one mapping between these directionless views (ν 1 , ν 2 ) and the interaction of D with its oracles. Therefore, (ν 1 , ν 2 ) properly summarizes the conversation.
To simplify our security analysis, we will reveal the keying information to D at the end of the interaction. This "trick" was employed in earlier H-coefficient technique based security proofs of Even-Mansour constructions (see, e.g., [25, 22, 23] ), but because for E the key is first transformed to obtain the masks, the situation is slightly more technical, and we follow ideas from [65] . In more detail, we reveal
In the real world, we have
is the key used for the entire game. In the ideal world, we set K
Note that the disclosure of ν K is without loss of generality: it will only increase the success probability of D. The total view is denoted
We assume that D never makes duplicate queries, and hence ν 1 contains no duplicate elements, and the same for ν 2 .
Attainable Views and View-Compliant Oracles. Denote by X O the probability distribution of views when interacting with O, and similarly X P the probability distribution of views when interacting with P. A view ν is called "attainable" if it may appear during an interaction with P, or formally if Pr (X P = ν) > 0.
Throughout, we will only focus on attainable views. Concretely, for ν 1 this implies that for any j = j such that (X j ,ī j ) = (X j ,ī j ), we have M j = M j and C j = C j . For ν 2 , attainability implies that for all j = j , we have x j = x j and y j = y j .
We say that a tweakable permutation π ∈ Perm(T , b) is compliant with construction view ν ! , denoted y 1 ) , . . . , (x p , y p )} is a primitive view (for instance, ν P = ν 2 or ν P = ν K ), we say that a permutation P ∈ Perm(b) is compliant with ν P , denoted P ν P , if P (x) = y for each (x, y) ∈ ν P .
Patarin's H-Coefficient Technique. Our proof is based on Patarin's H-coefficient technique [71] . We will follow the formalism of Chen and Steinberger [23] .
Lemma 9 (Patarin's Technique).
Let D be a deterministic distinguisher. Denote by V the set of attainable views, and consider a partition V = V good ∪ V bad of V into good and bad views. Let 0 ≤ ε be such that for all ν ∈ V good ,
Then, the distinguishing advantage satisfies ∆ D (O; P) ≤ ε + Pr (X P ∈ V bad ). A proof of this lemma can be found, among others, in [23, 22] . At a high level, the idea of the technique is to identify views for which the fraction of (7) is large, and to isolate them as being "bad" views. Then, for all "good" views the distributions X O and X P are relatively close to each other and ε will be small. Note that if the definition of bad views is too loose, Pr (X P ∈ V bad ) will be large, while if it is too tight, ε will be larger.
Definition of Bad Views. Note that in the real world, all tuples in ν define an input/output-tuple for P : for ν 2 and ν K this is clear, for ν 1 this follows from the definition of E. Provided no collision within these tuples occurs, ν defines exactly q + p + s tuples for P . Inspired by this, we will call a transcript bad if any collision occurs. Formally, ν is called bad if one of the following conditions holds:
We write bad = bad 1,1 ∨ bad 1,2 ∨ bad 1,K ∨ bad 2,K ∨ bad K,K . Above bad events are structured as follows: bad 1,1 covers both possible collisions (input-and output-) of tuples within ν 1 ; bad 1,2 and bad 1,K cover collisions between ν 1 on the one hand and ν 2 resp. ν K on the other hand. Similarly for bad 2,K and bad K,K . Note that, by attainability of views, there are no collisions within ν 2 , hence there is no such bad event as bad 2,2 . Also, note that for bad K,K the input values in bad K,K never collide, as they are of the form Y K and
In the remainder of the proof, we will derive an upper bound on the probability that a bad view appears in the ideal world, Pr (X P ∈ V bad ), and we will show that for any good transcript we have Pr (X O = ν) ≥ Pr (X P = ν). This will immediately complete the proof via Lemma 9.
Probability of Bad View in Ideal World. Our goal is to bound Pr (X P ∈ V bad ). Let ν be any view in the ideal world P = ( π ± , P ± ), and denote by Pr (bad) the probability that this view satisfies bad. By basic probability theory,
Recall that by definition of the ideal world, we have K
For queries withī j = (0, . . . , 0), we will additionally use that this query is necessarily made in forward direction, which implies that the value C j is randomly drawn from a set of size at least 2 b − q.
Regarding bad 1,1 , let (X,ī, M, C), (X ,ī , M , C ) ∈ ν 1 be any two distinct queries. We make a distinction depending on the values (X,ī) and (X ,ī ):
-If (X,ī) = (X ,ī ), we necessarily have M = M and C = C by attainability of transcripts and bad 1,1 is set by these two queries with probability 0;
-If X = X , then K X and K X are two independently generated random values and we argue based on the former. The condition of bad 1,1 reads:
, by Definition 1 part 1 this happens with probability at most 2/2 ;
and Definition 1 part 2 directly shows that the condition is satisfied with probability at most 2/2 .
Summing over all possible queries, we obtain Pr (bad 1,1 ) ≤
Regarding bad 1,2 , let (X,ī, M, C) ∈ ν 1 and (x, y) ∈ ν 2 by any two queries. Let (K X , K X ) ∈ ν K be the unique tuple in ν K corresponding to the tweak X in the tuple from ν 1 . As
, by Definition 1 part 1 the two queries satisfy the condition of bad 1,2 with probability at most 2/2 . Summing over all possible queries, we obtain Pr (bad 1,2 ) ≤ 2qp 2 .
Regarding bad 1,K , we divide it into two subcases: Regarding bad 2,K , we divide it into two subcases: Concluding the case of bad 2,K , we obtain Pr (bad 2,K ) ≤ . Summing over all possible queries, we obtain
To conclude, from (8) we obtain
where the simplification is done using s ≤ q and 2
Probability Ratio for Good Views. We will prove that for any good view ν, we have Pr (X O = ν) ≥ Pr (X P = ν). It suffices to compute the fraction of oracles that could result in view ν for both worlds O and P. Recall that D never makes redundant queries, and that the views are assumed to be attainable and good. The proof follows [65] almost verbatim, but a few technicalities occur and we include the proof for completeness.
Regarding the real world, goodness of the view guarantees that (a) every tuple in ν 1 defines exactly one input/output-tuple of P , (b) every tuple in ν 2 and ν K corresponds to exactly one input/output-tuple of P , and (c) that none of these tuples collide in the input or the output. Recall that the input values in ν K are of the form Y K. Therefore we derive:
Regarding the ideal world, we group the elements of ν 1 according to the tweak values. For T ∈ T , define
where T q T = q. Now,
. Note furthermore that for any α, β ≤ 2 b we have
. We thus get
This completes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 5 (Security of OPP)
. Let D be a nonce-respecting AE distinguisher against OPP, which means that it never makes an encryption query for a nonce that was used before. For brevity and rigority, write E P K := OPPE K and D P K := OPPD K , including an explicit mentioning of the underlying primitive P . As explained in Section 4, we can identify the tweakable blockcipher E of Section 3 in OPP. It is used for tweak space T = T 0 ∪ T 1 , where
We replace E with a random secret tweakable permutation π $ ← − Perm(T , b), and find by a hybrid argument:
where D 1 is some MTPRP distinguisher making at most σ construction queries and at most p queries to P ± (in the q E + q D evaluations of E and D, the underlying E is evaluated at most σ times). By Lemma 4, the masking space T is b-proper, and by Theorem 2 we obtain
We proceed with the remaining ∆-distance. First note that all construction oracles are independent of P ± and hence we can drop it without loss of generality. Now, this ∆-distance is in fact the AE security of ΘCB3 of Krovetz and Rogaway [58] . Even though they analyze the privacy and authenticity of ΘCB3 separately, their bounds directly apply and we obtain
Concluding, we find that
C Proof of Theorem 6 (Security of MRO)
The section is divided as follows. In Appendix C.1, we consider pseudorandom functions based on secret tweakable permutations, and derive a bound on the security of MROAbs. Similarly, we consider the IV-CPA security of MROEnc in Appendix C.2. The proof of Theorem 6 is then given in Appendix C.3.
C.1 Secret-Primitive Pseudorandom Functions
Let π 
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of π and $ F . By Adv prf F (q, σ) we denote the maximum advantage over all distinguishers that make at mostueries to the construction encryption oracle, of total length at most σ padded blocks.
Secret-Primitive
MROAbs. We will analyze the PRF security of a keyless variant MROAbs : {0, for every input. Following, Namprempre et al. [68] , we define the IV-based chosen plaintext attack (IV-CPA) security of E based on P as
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of E, π and $ E . By Adv iv-cpa E (q, σ) we denote the maximum advantage over all distinguishers that make at mostueries to the construction encryption oracle, of total length at most σ padded blocks.
MROEnc. We will analyze the IV-CPA security of a keyless variant MROEnc : As explained in Section 5, we can identify the tweakable blockcipher E of Section 3 in MRO. It is used for tweak space
We replace E with a random secret tweakable permutation π
, and find by a hybrid argument:
where Abs π is the keyless PRF of Fig. 8 and Enc π the encryption scheme of Fig. 9 (with Dec π its corresponding decryption function), and where D 1 is some MTPRP distinguisher making at most σ construction queries and at most p queries to P ± (in the q E + q D evaluations of E and D, the underlying E is evaluated at most σ times). By Lemma 4, the masking space T is b-proper, and Theorem 2 applies.
We proceed with the remaining ∆-distance. As before, the construction oracles are independent of P ± and we can drop it without loss of generality. Let π
as Abs and Enc/Dec evaluate π on different tweaks. Above reduction allows to view the absorption and encryption to be independently keyed (via π and π ). This paves the path for the use of a separation of AE security into PRF security of Abs and IV-CPA security of Enc, as inspired by the MAC-then-Encrypt approach of Namprempre et al. [68] and its adaption to misuse resistance as presented by Gueron and Lindell [39] . For completeness, we re-derive it for our current setting. We have
where D 2 is some PRF distinguisher making at most q E + q D queries to the construction encryption oracle, of total length at most σ blocks. Regarding the remaining distance:
where D 3 is some IV-CPA distinguisher making at most q E queries to the construction encryption oracle, of total length at most σ blocks. The remaining distance boils down to forging a tag for a random $ F , in which D succeeds with probability at most A bound on the first term follows from Theorem 2 and the b-properness of the masking. The second two advantages are bounded using Lemmas 10 and 11.
D Proof of Theorem 7 (Security of MRS)
The proof is structurally different from the one of OPP and MRO, and particular does not rely on MEM. The remainder of this section is as follows. In Appendix D.1, we present a (normal) blockcipher underlying MRS. Then, in Appendix D.2 we discuss the Duplex construction. The proof is given in Appendix D.3.
D.1 Blockcipher Construction
Let P 
Note that this is a tweakable blockcipher with empty tweak space, T = ∅, and the model of Section 2 carries over. We will explain how this blockcipher appears in MRS. Note that in MRSAbs, the state is initialized with 0 b−k K. The trick will be to XOR this value everywhere in-between two consecutive evaluations of P , in a similar fashion as done in [21, 3, 66] . As k ≤ c, this adjustment is artificial and it does not change the scheme. In this case, MRSAbs is effectively just compressing its blocks one by one, interleaved with an evaluation of E MRS (K, ·). The situation for MRSEnc is identical. Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaption of Theorem 2 of [3] to k-bit keys. See also [66] . 
The proof is completed using Lemmas 12 and 13.
E Proof of Theorem 8 (Security of MRSO)
The proof is fairly similar to the one of MRO (Appendix C), the only major difference is in the use of a different tweakable blockcipher. In Appendix E.1 we identify the tweakable blockcipher used in MRSO. Then, in Section we consider the PRF security of MRSAbs. The proof of Theorem 8 is then given in Appendix E.3
E.1 Tweakable Blockcipher Constructions
It is already mentioned in Section 7 that a slightly different masking is employed. More detailed, the tweak space is We briefly elaborate on the appearance of E MRSO in MRSO. At a high level, the trick for MRSAbs is to start considering appearances of E MRSO from the second permutation (unlike the first as done in Appendix D). This would work well if the value P (N 0 * 0 K) is XORed twice everywhere in-between two permutation calls, but because at the end of MRSAbs the leftmost τ bits of the state are extracted, this is impossible. However, it is clear that by XORing only the rightmost b − τ bits into the state everywhere, this will only decrease the security of MRSAbs, and the artificial XORings do not alter the scheme. For MROEnc on the other hand, the change to only XORing the rightmost b − τ bits is for simplicity of analysis.
It is trivial to see that the masking is (b − τ )-proper in accordance with Definition 1, and Theorem 2 applies.
E.2 Secret-Primitive Pseudorandom Functions MRSAbs
We will analyze the PRF security (cf. Appendix C.1) of a keyless variant MRSAbs : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} * ×{0, 1} * → {0, 1} 
